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THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
The insured, when he voluntarily engages in a criminal assault, should be
held to have foreseen the inevitable result of such encounters. He exposes himself
at the very least to injury, the degree of which is impossible to estimate or foresee,
possibly death. The compassion engendered for the plight of beneficiaries or sur-
vivors of the deceased insured, whose death was a result of acts of resistance prof-
fered by the assaulted party in his self-defense, should not be permitted to sway
juries or courts to irrational conclusions.
Robert J MacDonald
CONTRACTS. DISAFFIRMANCE BY A MINOR.
In a recent case,' an Alabama court of appeals held that an automobile was
not a necessity for which a minor must pay the reasonable value, and affirmed the
lower court's decision permitting the minor to avoid a contract of purchase for an
automobile.
The minor was married and had purchased the automobile for use as a convey-
ance for himself to and from his home and place of employment, a distance of about
eight miles. He also owned a truck which he likewise used to drive to and from
work, and which was still available for such use. The court commented on this
latter fact in reaching its conclusion that the automobile was not a necessity.
In view of the present weight of authority with regard to the necessity of an
automobile for a minor, this decision is sound. It has long been accepted that,
except for his necessaries, an infant has the right to disaffirm his contracts. The
basic statement, one often quoted by the courts, as to what constitutes a necessity
was made by Lord Coke: "€  an infant may bind himself to pay for his necessary
meat, drinke, apparell, necessary physicke, and likewise for his good teaching or
instruction, whereby he may profit himselfe afterwards." 2
The word "necessary" is obviously a relative term.s What may be necessary in
one case is not necessary in the next. Station in life, income, use, alternatives,
needs,4 etc., all have a bearing in determining just what may be a necessity in a
given situation. Williston writes: "Necessaries seem to be limited by the courts
as closely as possible, and generally come under the heads of food, or clothing of
a reasonable kind, purchased for the use of the infant himself or of his family." 5
Where the car has been used, as in the principal case, for going to and from
work, the courts have held that such an automobile is not a necessity In Cham-
bers v. Dunmyer, the distance travelled was six and a half miles, and the court said:
"To have been considered a necessary, the automobile must have been essential to
the bodily or mental needs of the plaintiff and not for business purposes." 6
This case was approved in First Discount Corp. v. Hatcher Auto Sales,7 where the
mnor used the car to go back and forth to work.
In Perry Auto Co. v. Mainland et al.8 the infant lived one and a half miles from
I Hanis v. Raughton, -Ala.- , 73 So.2d 921 (1954).
2 Co. Lnrr. 172a (1818 ed.).
3 Freiburghaus v. Herman Body Co., - MoApp.-, 102 S.W.2d 743 (1937).
4 Harris v. Raughton, - la.--, 73 So.2d 921 (1954).
5 WusToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 241.
6 74 Ohio App. 235, 58 N.E.2d 239, 240 (1943).
7
--- Ohio App.-, 104 N.E.2d 587 (1950).
8 229 Iowa 187, 294 N.W 281 (1940).
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the plant at which he was employed. The court pointed out that when the plaintiff
had an automobile, he used it to transport himself to and from his place of employ-
ment, but when he did not have a car he walked. The court therefore held the car
was not a necessity.
In Schoenung v. Gallet9 the plaintiff was nineteen years old, emancipated, liv-
ing with his parents, and had three miles to go to work. The court allowed the
plaintiff to disaffirm, pointing out that the minor had his brother's automobile
available, and saying that to be a necessity the item under consideration must be
such as to supply the personal needs of the infant. In a 1951 case'0 the court again
disallowed the defendant's claim that the automobile was a necessity, basing its
decision on the fact that the automobile was used for transportation to and from
work, a distance of five to six miles, and that other means of transportation could
be used.
In a recent case, the minor was, as in the cases discussed above, allowed to dis-
affirm his contract for the purchase of an automobile. The trial court, in dismissing
the minor's complaint for want of equity, assigned no reason for denying relief.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the decree was reversed. The court
said the weight of the evidence showed the car not to have been a necessary How-
ever, Chief Justice Smith, dissenting, said:
"My own view is that if employment took hun away from home for the week and
his use of the car was to spend Saturday mght at Sheridan, the transportation was a
part of his business arrangement and the car was used for business purposes." 11
The plaintiff's physical appearance, the fact that he had twice previously mis-
represented his age, coupled with the facts that he was married and "a man of his
own," all entered into the reasoning of the dissent: "... . Here is a case where
any court could, as the Chancellor must have found, say that the buyer's use of
the car and his conduct in getting it should bind the contract."
Though a dissent, this is a recognition that under certain circumstances the
automobile might be a necessity Courts have admitted that such circumstances
could exist.'2 The Indiana Supreme Court indicated that use of the car in gaining
a livelihood is such a circumstance.' 3 But, as indicated by the cases discussed, the
use of the car as transportation to and from work has not been considered such a
circumstance.
What if the automobile is used for more than just transportation to and from
work? Here again the courts have been very reluctant to hold the minor to his
contract of purchase. In Barger v. M. & J. Finance Corporation the court said:
"The evidence in the instant case tends to show that the ownership of an automobile
was advantageous to the plaintiff and that he would not have been promoted without
an automobile available for his use. Nevertheless it does not appear that an automo-
bile was necessary for him to earn a livelihood. Hence we are of opimon and hold that
an automobile is not among those necessaries for which a minor may be held liable. ' 14
This case seems to indicate that the circumstance under which this court would
hold an automobile to be a necessity would have to be actual necessity to earn a
livelihood.
9 206 Wis. 52, 238 N.W 852 (1931).
10 Reeme v. Motors Securities Co., Inc. - LaApp.-, 51 So.2d 833 (1951).
11 Barnes v. Rebsainen Motors, Inc., 221 Ark. 791, 255 S.W.2d 961, 962 (1953).12 Worman Motor Co. v. Hill, 54 Arz. 227, 94 P.2d 865 (1939).
Is McKee v. Hardwood Automobile Co., 204 Ind. 233, 183 N.E. 646 (1932).
14 221 N.C. 64, 18 S.E.2d 826, 827 (1942).
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In Russell v. Buck et al., even though trucking had been the means whereby
the infant supported his family, the court refused to say trucks were to be consid-
ered necessaries, going so far as to say:
"It does not appear that the owning or leasing and the operation of a truck or trucks
was the only means of livelihood open to him." 15
Here, too, we have a minor who was marned, and presumably on his own. Still
the circumstances under which the court would consider the automobile a neces-
sity were more than an actual need in the particular calling entered by the mnnor.
To this court it was a question of whether or not there were any other means of
livelihood available at all.
In Utterstrom v. Kidder16 we again have a minor purchasing a truck for more
than just transportation to and from work. The minor was a sheet metal worker
and had used the truck in his business. When the truck became snowbound, the
minor abandoned it, and the defendant repossessed it. The minor then sued to
disaffirm and get back what he had paid. The defendant unsuccessfully argued
necessity The court said that necessity, as far as a minor is concerned, is not
extended to articles purchased for business purposes.
However, in a suit by the minor to disaffirm a contract by which the minor had
purchased a milk route and truck, the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in Haynze eb al.
v. Discus,'7 affirmed the lower court's holding that the properties sold were neces-
saries. The court said it was a question of fact and because no testimony of the
trial court was before it, it would not upset the lower court's findings. This result
still leaves open the question as to what the decision of the Supreme Court of
Arkansas would have been had the testimony of the trial court been before it.
In Williams et al. v. Buckler' s the suit was by a bailor against a bailee, a minor,
who allegedly wrongfully converted the bailor's farm machinery, including a farm
tractor. The court held that where a minor, at the time he entered into the con-
tract for use of the tractor, was supporting himself and his family by tilling the
soil, such tractor was a "necessity," and the minor could be held liable for the
breach of his bailment contract. The court said: "An infant must live as well as a
man."' 91 The court apparently extended the narrow limits placed upon a minor's
necessaries beyond that of "meat, drinke, apparell, necessary physicke," to the
means whereby these necessaries are obtained. The court, however, was careful
to distinguish between a farm tractor and an automobile, which is said could not
ordinarily be termed a necessary Nevertheless, the latter two cases seem to indi-
cate that some motorized vehicles may be considered necessaries.
The law is well settled in practically all jurisdictions that an automobie, as
such, is not a necessary Some courts, however, have indicated that if the automo-
bile were purchased to be used as the only means whereby a mnnor could earn a
livelihood, it might then be considered a necessary, but no cases have been found
where such a circumstance exists.
Twenty-five or thirty years ago, the automobile certainly was not as common
as it is today With ever increasing distances to travel to work the automobile has
15 116 Vt. 40, 68 A.2d 691, 694 (1949).
16 124 Me. 10, 124 A. 725 (1924).
17 210 Ark. 1092, 199 S.W.2d 954 (1947).
is- Ky.- , 264 S.W.2d 279 (,1954).
19 Supra note 18 at 280.
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